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Abstract
Groups competing for a prize need to determine how to distribute it among
their members in case of victory. Considering competition between two groups of
different size, we show that the small group’s sharing rule is a strategic complement
to the large group’s sharing rule in the sense that if the small group chooses a more
meritocratic sharing rule, the large group wishes to choose a more meritocratic rule
as well. On the contrary, the large group’s sharing rule is a strategic substitute to
the small group’s sharing rule, hence the timing of choice is crucial. For sufficiently
private prizes, a switch from a simultaneous choice to the small group being the
leader consists in a Pareto improvement and reduces aggregate effort. On the
contrary, when the large group is the leader aggregate effort increases. As a result,
the equilibrium timing is such that the small group chooses its sharing rule first.
If the prize is not private enough, the small group retires from the competition
and switching from a simultaneous to a sequential timing may reverse the results
in terms of aggregate effort. The sequential timing also guarantees that the small
group never outperforms the large one.
Keywords: collective rent seeking, sequential, group size paradox, sharing
rules, strategic complements, strategic substitutes
JEL classification: C72, D23, D72, D74
∗We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers, an associate editor, the editor and the audience at
the Contests: Theory and Evidence Conference in Norwich (2016) for their helpful comments. The
authors gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
through grants ECO2013-48496-C4-1-R (Balart), ECO2016-75410-P (Flamand), and ECO2015-67171-P
(Troumpounis). An earlier version of this paper was entitled “Rent seeking in sequential group contests”.
†Department of Business Economics, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Carretera de Valldemossa, km
7.5 (Edifici Jovellanos), 07022 Palma de Mallorca, Spain, e-mail: pau.balart@uib.cat
‡Department of Economics and CREIP, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Av. de la Universitat 1, 43204
Reus, Spain, email: sabine.flamand@urv.cat
§University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus Platz, D-50923 Cologne, Germany, phone: +49 221 4701450,
fax: +49 221 4701816, e-mail: oliver.guertler@uni-koeln.de




Contests among organizations and groups of individuals are widespread. Examples in-
clude research and development races, pre-electoral campaigns, procurement contests, or
even sport and art contests. In all the above, groups’ performance depends on individ-
ual contributions of their members, which implies that groups need to coordinate and
establish some rules regarding their internal organization. As the literature on collective
contests has pointed out, a key element of groups’ organization is related to the allocation
of the prize among the winning group members.1
While contests among groups are generally thought as simultaneous, the timing in
which contenders organize and implement their internal rules need not necessarily be so.
Indeed, there is no a priori reason to believe that before the actual competition takes
place, the timing in which the involved organizations decide upon their governing rules
coincides. Differences in the size or in the informational advantage of organizations, as
well as the existence of some established organizations challenged by an entrant, may
result in the sequential determination of their governing rules. Consequently, groups
involved in a simultaneous competition may well be deciding upon their internal rules in
a sequential fashion. Similar to previous literature, we find that if the order of moves is
determined endogenously, the equilibrium timing of the game is a sequential one, and this
very fact constitutes a strong justification for departing from the simultaneity assumption
(Baik and Shogren, 1992; Leininger, 1993; Morgan, 2003).2
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on collective contests by showing how
different timings with respect to groups’ choice of sharing rules alter individual incentives
and thus group performance. In our two-group model, most of our results arise from the
following observations: The small group’s sharing rule is a strategic complement to the
large group’s sharing rule in the sense that if the small group chooses a more meritocratic
sharing rule, the large group wishes to choose a more meritocratic rule as well, while the
large group’s sharing rule is a strategic substitute to the small group’s sharing rule.3 When
1Starting with Nitzan (1991), the literature has considered both exogenous and endogenous sharing
rules. For a recent survey on prize-sharing rules in collective rent seeking, see Flamand and Troumpounis
(2015). For surveys of the literature on individual contests in general, see among others Corcho´n (2007),
Konrad (2009), Long (2013), Corcho´n and Serena (2016) and also Dechenaux et al. (2015) for the
related experimental evidence. On collective contests, see the recent survey by Kolmar (2013), and also
Sheremeta (2017) for a recent review of experimental evidence.
2Hoffmann and Rota-Graziosi (2012) consider a general two-player contest model and they qualify
previous results by showing that a sequential structure does not always result if the order of moves is
endogenized. Most importantly, they assume that the prize to be awarded in the contest may depend
on the chosen efforts. This assumption introduces an additional strategic effect, potentially leading to
different results regarding the order of moves.
3Gal-Or (1985) is an early paper studying incentives and payoffs in sequential games. In a model
with homogenous players, she already indicated that the results crucially depend on whether reaction
functions are upward or downward sloping.
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both groups are active, the large group acting as the leader behaves in a similar manner
as in a standard Stackelberg duopoly model. That is, the large group commits to a more
meritocratic sharing rule than in the simultaneous game (hence effort increases), while the
small group selects a less meritocratic rule than in the simultaneous game (hence effort
decreases). On the contrary, the small group acting as the leader follows a very different
strategy. It commits to a less meritocratic rule than in the simultaneous game, thereby
weakening competition between groups. In turn, the large group also responds with a
less meritocratic rule than in the simultaneous game. The latter finding is reminiscent
of the main result in Kolmar and Wagener (2013). They consider a group contest and
investigate whether groups have an incentive to implement a costless mechanism that
solves a group’s free-rider problem with respect to the group members’ effort choices.
Surprisingly, they find that the weaker (e.g., smaller or less productive) group sometimes
wishes to abstain from implementing the mechanism. Adopting the mechanism may be
problematic for the weaker group because the stronger group may react by competing
more aggressively, implying that the contest may escalate. The main difference between
our paper and the one by Kolmar and Wagener (2013) is the following. We assume that
groups decide sequentially about their sharing rules, whereas the groups in their paper
decide simultaneously about the adoption of the mechanism. Furthermore, by changing
the sharing rule in our paper a group can affect the efforts of its members continuously;
this is different from the paper by Kolmar and Wagener (2013) in which the adoption of
the mechanism leads to a discrete change in efforts.
In contrast to the simultaneous timing (Balart et al., 2016), the small group never out-
performs the large one in terms of winning probabilities. In other words, Olson (1965)’s
celebrated group size paradox (GSP) vanishes regardless of the leader’s size. The exact
nature of the prize is also key to group performance. Indeed, we show that when the
prize is not private enough and the sharing rules allow for transfers, the sequential choice
of sharing rules leads to monopolization, a situation in which one group retires from the
competition (Ueda, 2002). Interestingly, the large group takes advantage of its leadership
by preventing the small group from being active for a greater range of privateness of the
prize compared to the simultaneous case (Balart et al., 2016), thereby making monopo-
lization more likely. However, this is not true when it is the small group that moves first,
as in this case monopolization occurs in the same instances as in the simultaneous game.
Our results clearly have implications regarding aggregate effort expenditures. When
the large group is the leader, and provided that the prize is private enough so that both
groups are active, total rent-seeking expenditures increase with respect to the simultane-
ous case. Conversely, when the small group is the leader, and again provided that both
groups are active, aggregate effort is lower compared to the simultaneous case. Situations
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are conceivable in which a designer has an impact on certain parameters of the contest
like the order of moves. Thus, if from the designer’s point of view effort is valuable, he
should possibly oblige the two groups to choose their sharing rules simultaneously, or
even force the large group to move first. If effort is instead considered as wasteful, the
designer should opt for the design where the small group is the leader. In this latter case,
in fact, the designer should not intervene in the game since the unique equilibrium of the
game with an endogenous choice of the timing structure gives the leadership to the small
group whenever both groups are active. Notice that in contrast to what happens when
both groups are active, when the small group is inactive switching from a simultaneous
to a sequential timing may reverse the results in terms of aggregate effort. Thus, the
degree of privateness of the prize is a critical feature that should be taken into account
to understand the implications of different timing arrangements.
Litigation is one example that our model can be applied to. Since parties involved in
a legal battle spend irretrievable resources to prevail in court, litigation has often been
modeled as a rent-seeking contest (Baye et al., 2005; Farmer and Pecorino, 1999; Gu¨rtler
and Kra¨kel, 2010). Many law firms make use of incentive pay, conditioning lawyers’
compensation on their individual performance (for example, through bonus payments),
which is typically measured by the number of billable hours. The structure of incentive
pay differs among firms, some firms require lawyers to bill at least 1,600 hours a year,
others demand much higher numbers. The size of bonuses also differs among firms.
In the US, many law firms provide publicly accessible information about their com-
pensation practices in the NALP Directory of Legal Employers.4 Among other things,
these firms publicly state whether they pay bonuses to eligible lawyers, what factors a
possible bonus payment is based on, and whether a minimum exists for billable hours.
Hence, law firms, by simply checking the NALP Directory of Legal Employers, have a
very good idea about compensation practices at their competitors, meaning that incentive
schemes are publicly known. Finally, not all law firms provide the NALP Directory of
Legal Employers with information about their compensation practices at the same time.
Accordingly, sequential determination of compensation rules is conceivable if a firm gath-
ers information about compensation practices at competing firms, and then chooses and
discloses its own compensation practice.
To have a concrete example at hand, suppose that there is a legal battle, and the
involved parties are represented by Baker & McKenzie and Shearman & Sterling, respec-
tively, two law firms that are located in New York City. Baker & McKenzie reports in the
4Compensation practices for this example can be found at http://www.nalpdirectory.com/index.cfm.
In a similar spirit, disclosure is often a feature of executive pay of CEOs and board of directors. In the
UK, for instance, regulations that involve disclosure of remuneration were implemented in 2013 (Gupta
et al., 2016).
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NALP Directory of Legal Employers that both base salaries and bonuses depend on the
number of billable hours and that lawyers are expected to bill at least 2,000 hours a year.
In contrast, Shearman & Sterling reports that base salaries depend only on seniority and
emphasizes that a minimum billable hour requirement does not exist. This means that at
Baker & McKenzie firm profits (that typically depend on how successful the firm is doing
in court) are more likely to be shared according to individual performance, whereas at
Shearman & Sterling individual performance is relatively less important. In other words,
the choice of different compensation contracts can be understood as a choice of different
sharing rules.
2 The Model
There are two groups i = A,B with ni ∈ N members and let us refer to A as the large
group (i.e., nA > nB > 1).
5 Each member k = 1, 2, ..., ni of group i chooses his individual
level of effort eki ≥ 0 whose cost is linear. The valuation of the prize is the same for all
individuals, and is denoted by V .6 The probability that group i wins the between-group











k=1 eki is the total effort of group i.
7 Individuals are risk neutral, and the



















2V for Ei = Ej = 0
0 for Ei = 0, Ej > 0
(1)
for i = A,B and i 6= j, and where αi is group i’s sharing rule and measures the level
of meritocracy. The parameter p ∈ (0, 1] denotes the degree of privateness of the prize
(p = 0 would correspond to the case of a pure public good while p = 1 corresponds to the
5If nA = nB the timing of choices of group sharing rules is irrelevant (see Footnote 15).
6The assumption of symmetric valuations is the standard one in the literature on endogenous sharing
rules, mainly for tractability reasons. In order to analyze the choice of selective incentives in the presence
of heterogeneity within groups, Nitzan and Ueda (2016) assume that the contested prize is a public good,
and focus on cost sharing rules rather than prize sharing rules, which allows them to tackle the problem
analytically. They show that intra-group heterogeneity prevents the effective use of selective incentive
mechanisms. For recent approaches with asymmetric valuations see Heijnen and Schoonbeek (2017) and
references therein.
7This type of contest success function is widely used in the literature and has been axiomatized by
Skaperdas (1996). Alternatively, many authors have used all-pay auctions to model competition, which
have been analyzed by Baye et al. (1996).
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case of a pure private good).8 Indeed, an important feature of collective contests is that
the prize sought by competing groups may often be interpreted as a mixture between a
public and a private good. Local governments competing for funds typically devote them
to the provision of both monetary transfers and local public goods. Similarly, prizes in
research and development races involve both reputational and monetary benefits for the
winning team. More generally, any prize sought by competing groups may be interpreted
as a mixture between a public and a private good insofar as the winners derive some
benefits in terms of status, reputation, or satisfaction following a victory.
The sharing rule αi ≥ 0 represents how tied the allocation of the private part of
the prize is on individual contributions (i.e., meritocracy) as opposed to egalitarianism in
group i. Previous literature on sharing rules in collective rent seeking has considered both
the cases of αi ∈ [0, 1] (Baik, 1994; Lee, 1995; Noh, 1999; Ueda, 2002) and αi ∈ [0,∞)
(Baik and Shogren, 1995; Baik and Lee, 1997, 2001; Lee and Kang, 1998; Balart et al.,
2016). If αi > 1, the sharing rule of group i allows for transfers among its members, as in
Hillman and Riley (1989).9 In such case, group i collects −(1−αi) pni Ei(EA+EB)V from each
of its members and allocates αip
Ei
(EA+EB)
V according to their relative contributions.10
We consider a multi-stage game where sharing rules are chosen prior to the choice of




11 The equilibrium concept is subgame perfection in pure
strategies.12
8Notice that we exclude the possibility of a pure public good, in which case sharing rules are irrelevant.
For the analysis of these cases refer to the multiple equilibria results in Katz et al. (1990). For more
recent approaches see also Baik (2016) and references therein.
9Cost-sharing in collective contests for purely public prizes can also be interpreted in terms of within-
group transfers (Nitzan and Ueda, 2016; Vazquez-Sedano, 2018).
10When the sharing rules do not allow for transfers among individuals (i.e., αi ∈ [0, 1] for i = A,B),
the equilibrium is identical regardless of the particular timing of the game. This occurs because the
constraints on the sharing rules are binding irrespective of the timing of the interaction, and thus allowing
one group to choose its sharing rule first does not alter the strength of competition compared to the
simultaneous case (formal results are available upon request).
11As the aggregate welfare of group i only depends on aggregate effort, and as in equilibrium aggregate
effort is unique for any αi, it follows that the sharing rule αi that maximizes the expected utility of the
representative individual in a within-group symmetric equilibrium also maximizes
∑
k∈iEUki. The
sharing rules may thus be chosen by a benevolent leader maximizing the welfare of the group, which can
be justified by the fact that such leader cannot do well without the support of the group members, that
is, without taking care of their welfare at least partially (Nitzan and Ueda, 2011).
12Equilibria in mixed strategies may exist when monopolization arises and there is a continuum of
equilibria in the first stage of the game. For example, when the large group moves first and plays a
unique pure strategy, there is a continuum of meritocracy levels that result in a zero payoff for the small
group and hence the small group randomizing over the continuum is also an equilibrium.
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2.1 Effort Stage and Simultaneous Sharing Rules
The simultaneous game consists in two stages: In stage one each group i = A,B chooses
its sharing rule αSi , while in stage two individuals choose their level of effort simultaneously
and independently.
At the effort stage, and given the chosen sharing rules, groups’ members choose their
level of effort by maximizing (1) subject to efforts being non-negative. The equilibrium
of this stage is solved in Balart et al. (2016) who generalize the results of Ueda (2002)
and Davis and Reilly (1999) by allowing for a mixed public-private prize, thereby leading
to the possibility of monopolization. More precisely, group i retires from the contest (i.e.,
eki = e˜i = 0 for all k ∈ i) whenever
αi ≤ ni [αjp(nj − 1)− nj(1− p)]− njp
(ni − 1)njp (2)
with i = A,B and j 6= i. As can be seen from (2), the less (more) meritocratic the sharing
rule of group i (j), the more likely that monopolization occurs, so that group i is inactive.
To understand the intuition for this result, consider a member of group i. This player’s
incentive to exert effort comes from two different sources. First, by exerting effort, the
player’s group becomes more likely to win the prize. Second, conditional on winning the
prize, by exerting effort the player secures a larger share of the prize for himself. A high
αj induces the members of group j to choose high effort, in which case group i is unlikely
to win the contest. Then the considered player’s effort has little impact on the contest
outcome, moderating the first effect. A low αi implies that efforts do not have a strong
impact on the distribution of the prize among group i’s members, thereby mitigating the
second effect. Taken together, when αi is low and αj is high, members of group i have
little incentive to exert effort so that it is likely that the group is inactive. In turn, when
group i is inactive, the members of group j compete in a standard nj-players Tullock
contest for a prize of valuation αjpV (i.e., the private part of the prize that is allocated
according to relative effort) and thus exert effort
ekj = e˜j =
αjp(nj − 1)
n2j
V , ∀k. (3)
Conversely, if both groups are active, i.e., if (2) is violated for i = A,B, individual effort
in the symmetric equilibrium is given by
eki = eˆi =
{ρj [ρi + αi(1− ρi)] + (1− ρj)αjρi}{njp(1− αi) + ni[nj(1− p(1− αi + αj)) + pαj ]}






+ (1 − p).13 Note that the above expression is a strictly convex second
degree polynomial in terms of αi. Violation of condition (2), which, as explained above,
imposes a lower bound on αi, guarantees that individual effort is increasing in own group’s
meritocracy level (αi). On the contrary, individual effort is decreasing in the other group’s
meritocracy level (αj).
Let us define αi3(αj) as the value of αi that satisfies (2) with equality, representing the
maximum value of αi that guarantees that group i’s members are inactive given any αj.
By switching the subscripts in (2), we can also define αi2(αj) as the minimum value of
αi guaranteeing that group j’s members are inactive given any αj. As αi2(αj) > αi3(αj)
we can write group i’s expected utility as follows:
EUi(αi) =

0 if 0 ≤ αi ≤ αi3(αj)
EˆU i(αA, αB) if αi3(αj) < αi < αi2(αj)
E˜U i(αi) if αi ≥ αi2(αj)
where EˆU i(αA, αB) denotes individual payoff in group i when both groups are active, and
E˜U i(αA, αB) denotes individual payoff in group i when only this group is active.
14 One
can now obtain the best response correspondence for the simultaneous choice of sharing
rules prior to the effort stage:
αi(αj) =

αi2(αj) for αj ≤ α˜j
αi1(αj) for α˜j < αj < αˆj
α˙i ∈ [0, αi3(αj)] for αj ≥ αˆj
(5)
Intuitively, the best response suggests that if group j selects a very “meritocratic” rule
(i.e., αj ≥ αˆj) then it is not worth being active for group i, so that it selects any α˙i ∈
[0, αi3(αj)] guaranteeing its inactivity. Conversely, if group j selects a very egalitarian rule
(i.e., αj ≤ α˜j), group i maximizes its payoff by preventing group j from being active in the
“cheapest” way (i.e., by choosing αi2(αj)). For intermediate values of αj group i selects
αi1(αj), both groups are active and αi1(αj) is obtained from the first order condition
when maximizing individual payoff with both groups active (i.e., EˆU i(αA, αB)).
Given the above best responses, Balart et al. (2016) show that when groups choose
their sharing rules simultaneously, there exists a threshold p1 =
nB(nA−nB−1)
1+nB(nA−nB−1) determin-
ing the occurrence of monopolization:
13The symmetric equilibrium presented is unique if αi > 0 for both i = A,B. In case of purely
egalitarian sharing rules, our setup is equivalent to the case of a pure public prize and multiple equilibria
may arise (see Balart et al. 2016 for a detailed characterization).
14In the Preliminaries of the Appendix we present a formal derivation of the best responses as well as




































































Figure 1: Simultaneous choice of sharing rules for p = 0.64 (left) and p = 0.72 (right)
and nA = 4, nB = 2.
• If p > p1, both groups are active and the sharing rule for i = A,B in the unique




2ninj(ni − 1) + Cip+Dip2
p [2ninj − p(ni(2nj − 1)− nj)]
where Ci = ninj(9− 4ni)− nj(nj + 2)− 2ni and Di = ninj(2ni − 7) + nj(nj + 3) + 3ni − 2.
• If 0 < p ≤ p1, only group A is active and the continuum of sharing rules in the










– αSB ∈ [ nB(1−p)+pp , nB [nA(1−p)+3p−2]−2p(nB−1)p ]
Figure 1 summarizes the best responses, the equilibrium sharing rules and the poten-
tial occurrence of monopolization. Observe that in both panels, the slope of a group’s
best response changes depending on the value of the other group’s sharing rule (as sum-
marized in (5)). Notice also that the occurrence of monopolization depends on p. In
the right panel where p > p1, the interior best responses αi1(αj) intersect outside of
the monopolization region, so that in the depicted equilibrium both groups are active.
In the left panel where p ≤ p1, the interior best responses αi1(αj) intersect within the
monopolization region, yielding multiple equilibria where only the large group is active.
The intuition for the results on monopolization is as follows. The larger group A has
an advantage compared to the smaller group B in that more members contribute effort to
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win the prize. At the same time, being larger is also detrimental since, upon winning, the
prize must be shared among a greater number of members. This latter effect, however,
only refers to the private, but not the public part of the prize. Thus, if and only if
the private part of the prize is sufficiently low, the size advantage of the larger group is
sufficiently important so that it can successfully deter the smaller group from actively
entering the contest.
3 Results
Our first result is essential to understand the implications of a sequential choice of sharing
rules:
Proposition 1. If both groups are active, the small group’s sharing rule is a strategic
complement to the large group’s sharing rule in the sense that if the small group chooses
a more meritocratic sharing rule, the large group wishes to choose a more meritocratic
rule as well. On the contrary, the large group’s sharing rule is a strategic substitute to
the small group’s sharing rule.
The interior best response αi1(αj) is linear and has a positive (negative) slope for
the large (small) group. In other words, the small (large) group’s sharing rule is a
strategic complement (substitute) to the large (small) group’s sharing rule irrespective of
the specific level at which we evaluate the best response. This, in turn, will determine
how each group chooses its sharing rule when given the opportunity to move first. More
specifically, each group being the leader precommits to a sharing rule such that the other
group (i.e., the follower) is induced to decrease its level of meritocracy compared to the
simultaneous game. That is, the large (small) group precommits to higher (lower) levels
of meritocracy, thereby increasing (reducing) the strength of competition.
This result has some similitudes as well as some interesting differences with respect
to the case of precommitment in effort levels by two players studied by Dixit (1987).
He finds that cross derivatives of equilibrium efforts are zero whenever the players are
symmetric and thus the timing of the game does not alter the precommitted effort levels.
This is also the case regarding the choice of sharing rules provided the two groups have
the same size (i.e., nA = nB = n).
15 Further, Dixit (1987) shows that in a two-player
asymmetric contest the effort of the underdog is a strategic complement to the effort of
the advantaged player, while the advantaged player’s effort is a strategic substitute to
the effort of the underdog. Similarly, in our context the small group’s sharing rule is a
15If the two groups have the same size (i.e., nA = nB = n), the equilibrium sharing rules are given by
αA = αB = 1 + n
1−p
p regardless of the order of moves, as in this case best responses are independent of
the other group’s sharing rule.
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strategic complement to the large group’s sharing rule, whereas the large group’s sharing
rule is a strategic substitute to the small group’s.16 The large group has an advantage in
the sense that it always wins with higher probability conditional on the members of the
two groups exerting the same level of individual effort. However, there is an important
difference with respect to the strategic implications found by Dixit (1987). In his case,
marginal returns to effort are increasing (decreasing) in the other player’s effort if it is
small (large) enough. This is not the case with sharing rules, for which strategic behaviors
only depend on group size.
The strategic responses depicted in the above Proposition hold for any combination
of sharing rules that make the two groups active and directly arise from the linearity of
the best responses. If we remove the linearity assumption in the cost of effort, the best
responses are no longer linear and the whole exercise proves intractable. However, one
could expect the strategic responses found in Proposition 1 to carry through if one were
to consider a convex cost function. To illustrate that, recall that Proposition 1 in essence
highlights a more “aggressive” choice of sharing rules by the large group due to its size
advantage, hence this should also be true if such size advantage is further exacerbated by
the presence of convex costs.
The differences in groups’ strategic behavior due to their size may be better under-
stood by focusing on a) the size deterrence effect, and b) the aggregate effort effect. The
size deterrence effect (Nitzan, 1991) penalizes the large group: a more numerous group
implies that the private part of the prize has to be divided among more individuals. The
aggregate effort effect (Balart et al., 2016), in contrast, is favorable to the large group: if
the two groups exert the same level of aggregate effort, the individual cost of effort will be
smaller for the members of the large group than for the members of the small group. In
other words, since there is a larger number of potential contributors in the large group, the
cost of effort is divided among more individuals. Notice now that the case of convex costs
would exacerbate the large group’s benefits from the aggregate effort effect as dividing
the cost of effort among more contributors would be more advantageous in that case.17
At the same time, a convex cost function should not affect the size deterrence effect since
the latter is only affected by the degree of privateness of the prize. Combining the fact
that convex costs exacerbate the advantage for the large group from the aggregate effort
effect, while not affecting its disadvantage from the size deterrence effect, it follows that
the larger group enjoys a higher advantage with convex costs than with linear costs. But
16For an application where reaction functions at the Nash equilibrium have slopes with opposite signs
relative to Dixit (1987), see Skaperdas et al. (2016).
17This feature is precisely the one that eliminates the occurrence of the group size paradox in Esteban
and Ray (2001). In their words, “if the marginal cost of effort rises sufficiently with respect to resources
contributed, then larger groups will have a higher win probability, even if the prize is purely private.”
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given that under linear costs of effort, the larger group is reacting more “aggressively”
than the small group for any degree of privateness of the prize, one should expect that
this is also true when the relative cost of effort of its members decreases. Symmetric
arguments can also be made for the small group, overall arguing that the strategic effects
found under the assumption of liner costs would still hold if the cost of effort is a convex
function.18
3.1 Sequential Timing
In the following subsections where the game is sequential, we consider the following three
stages: In stage one the leader (group i ∈ {A,B}) chooses its sharing rule αLi . In stage
two the follower (group j 6= i) chooses its sharing rule αFj . In stage three the members of
the two groups simultaneously and individually choose their effort levels (eLi , e
F
j ). In what
follows, we present the equilibrium choices of sharing rules (αLi , α
F
j ) in our formal results.
Effort levels (eLi , e
F
j ) chosen in stage three can be derived directly from expressions (3)
and (4).
3.1.1 Large group A is the leader
Proposition 2. Let p′1 =
nA(nA−nB−1)
1+nA(nA−nB−1) and group A be the leader:
• If p > p′1, both groups are active and the sharing rules in the unique subgame perfect







• If 0 < p ≤ p′1, only group A is active and the continuum of sharing rules in the









When the large group is the leader and both groups are active, we are in a situation
that is very similar to a standard Stackelberg duopoly model: Once the large group
commits to a more meritocratic rule than in the simultaneous case (αLA > α
S
A), the follower
reacts by selecting a less meritocratic rule than in the simultaneous case (αFB < α
S
B).
18In contrast, these arguments may not carry through if one were to consider a concave cost function
given that the latter would tend to favor the small group and therefore work “against” the previously
discussed logic where convex costs exacerbate the large group’s size advantage.
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Indeed, recall that the large group’s sharing rule is a strategic substitute to the small
group’s sharing rule (Proposition 1). Furthermore, having the leadership advantage allows
the large group to induce the small group to retire from the contestfor a larger range of
p than in the simultaneous case (i.e., p′1 > p1). In other words, the large group acting
as the leader is capable of tying the small group’s hands and oblige the latter to react
with a sharing rule leading to its own inactivity, and this for a larger range of p. In
turn, the small group is indifferent between choosing any of the sharing rules belonging
to the interval such that it retires from the contest. Observe that being the first mover
enables the large group to select its preferred equilibrium (i.e., the lowest αA) out of the
continuum arising in the simultaneous case. In other words, monopolization is achieved
in the “cheapest” way for the large group.
The following result will be useful in order to understand the implications of the
sequential interaction:
Proposition 3. When the large group A is the leader:
• If p > p1 then aggregate effort is strictly greater than in the simultaneous case.
• If p ≤ p1 then aggregate effort is smaller than in the simultaneous case.
If p is such that both groups are active (i.e., p > p′1), we saw that the large group
increases the level of meritocracy of its sharing rule compared to the simultaneous case,
which induces the small group to do the opposite. Given that the large group chooses
to strengthen competition between groups, these equilibrium sharing rules are such that
aggregate rent-seeking expenditures are strictly greater than when the groups select their
sharing rules simultaneously. If p is such that monopolization occurs in both the simulta-
neous and sequential cases (i.e., p ≤ p1), however, the above results are reversed. That is,
the large group reduces the level of meritocracy of its sharing rule with respect to the si-
multaneous case, so that aggregate effort is smaller. Finally, recall that when p1 < p < p
′
1
both groups are active in the simultaneous case while only the large one is active when
being the leader. Yet, the total effort that the large group’s members exert in order to
induce the small group to retire from the competition exceeds the sum of both groups’
efforts in the simultaneous case.
The next proposition addresses the GSP. The GSP refers to a situation where the small
group outperforms the large group in terms of winning probabilities (Olson, 1965).
Proposition 4. If the large group is the leader and for all values of p including full
privateness, the GSP never arises.
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When the large group chooses its sharing rule first, and contrary to the simultaneous
case, the GSP never takes place regardless of the degree of privateness of the prize. As
the large group acting as the leader selects a more meritocratic sharing rule than in the
simultaneous case, and as the small group reacts with a less meritocratic one, it follows
that aggregate effort increases in the large group, while it decreases in the small group.
As it turns out, these effort variations are large enough to eliminate the GSP.
3.1.2 Small group B is the leader
Our results are significantly altered by giving the leadership to the small group, which
again is a direct consequence of Proposition 1:
Proposition 5. Let group B be the leader:
• If p > p1, both groups are active and the sharing rules in the unique subgame perfect







• If 0 < p ≤ p1, only group A is active and the continuum of sharing rules in the









For all degrees of privateness of the prize such that both groups are active, and in
stark contrast to the case in which the large group is the leader, it turns out that when the
small group has the leadership advantage it strategically chooses to weaken competition
by selecting a less meritocratic rule than in the simultaneous game (αLB < α
S
B). In turn,
the large group also reacts with a less meritocratic rule than the one it selects when the
game is simultaneous (αFA < α
S
A). Indeed, recall that the small group’s sharing rule is a
strategic complement to the large group’s sharing rule (Proposition 1).
For sufficiently low degrees of privateness (p ≤ p1), the small group is not able to
take advantage of its leadership. Regardless of the choice of the small group in stage
one, in stage two the large group selects a highly meritocratic sharing rule so that the
small group retires from the contest in stage three. Observe that the threshold level of
privateness that determines whether the small group is active or inactive is identical to
the one obtained in the simultaneous case, that is, the small group cannot take advantage
of its leadership for any p ≤ p1.
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Proposition 6. When the small group B is the leader:
• If p > p1 then aggregate effort is strictly smaller than in the simultaneous case.




, while it can be either greater or smaller than in the simultaneous
case for αLB ≥ nB(1−p)+pp .
When p is such that both groups are active, both groups adopt relatively more egalitar-
ian rules than in the simultaneous game, their members exert a lower level of effort, hence
aggregate effort is smaller. As when the large group is the leader, when p is such that the
small group is inactive in both the simultaneous and sequential cases (i.e., p ≤ p1), the
above results may be reversed. More specifically, depending on which particular sharing
rule is chosen by the small group, aggregate effort may be greater in the simultaneous
than in the sequential case.
The next proposition again refers to the GSP. We demonstrated before that the GSP
does not arise if the large group is the leader. Interestingly, the same is true if the
small group is the leader, implying that the GSP never arises if group sharing rules are
determined sequentially.
Proposition 7. If the small group is the leader and for all values of p including full
privateness, the GSP never arises.
Observe that here, the GSP does not arise for a very different reason than when the
large group is the leader. The small group selects a sharing rule such that its members are
inactive when the prize is public enough (but not purely public), which clearly prevents
the occurrence of the GSP as in the previous cases. Then, if p > p1 the small group acting
as the leader strategically chooses to weaken competition by selecting a less meritocratic
rule than in the simultaneous game, which in turn induces the large group to adopt a
similar behavior. However, the reduction in meritocracy adopted by the small group is
relatively larger than the corresponding reduction in the large group, and is such that
the GSP vanishes.
Figure 2 summarizes our findings regarding the sequential choice of sharing rules and
the occurrence of monopolization and the GSP. As we commented, one of the differences
that arise when the large group moves first is that monopolization may occur for a wider
range of p. A related question concerns the way relative group size affects monopolization.
By doing that exercise, it can be shown that increasing the relative size of the small
group unambiguously reduces the likelihood of monopolization when the large group is


























Figure 2: Simultaneous versus sequential choice of sharing rules.
(or in the simultaneous case). This is illustrated in Figure 3, which plots the minimum
value of nA that makes group B inactive as a function of nB for p = 0.99 when the large
(black curve) or small (gray curve) group is the leader, respectively.19 When the small
group is the leader and nB = 2, monopolization occurs if and only if nA > 52. However,
when nB = 10, monopolization occurs if and only if nA > 20 (i.e., monopolization is
more likely). For higher values of nB the relationship between the threshold and the size
of the small group is monotonic and increasing. For nB > 20, monopolization requires
a difference of (approximately) no more than four individuals between the two teams,
irrespective of which group moves first.
Further, as can be seen in the figure, and as we already concluded from the finding
that p1 < p
′
1, monopolization is more likely when the large group moves first. Indeed, the
smaller nB, the greater the difference between the two curves.
In Figure 4 we plot the actual best responses as well as isoprofits for different com-
binations of meritocracy to obtain the intuition behind the equilibrium choices. In the
left panel, we display the equilibrium sharing rules when the large group is the leader
and compare them with the ones arising under a simultaneous timing, while in the right
panel, we do the same when the small group is the leader (both for nA = 4, nB = 2
and p = 1). Again, observe that the slope of the best response is positive for the large
group and negative for the small one. The simultaneous case is represented by the in-
19We do not present the formal results but they are available upon request.
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Figure 3: Minimum nA yielding monopolization when group A (black) or B (gray) moves
first, for p = 0.99 and different values of nB.
tersection of the two best responses. The sequential move equilibria are determined by
the tangency point between the isoprofit of the first mover and the best response of the
follower. When the large group is the leader, its equilibrium sharing rule is higher than
in the simultaneous case, and the one of the small group is lower. That is, the large
group chooses to strengthen competition, thereby inducing the small group to reduce
the meritocracy of its sharing rule. As a result, the large group moves to a higher level
isoprofit curve, while the opposite is true for the small group. We also observe that, when
the large group is the leader, the equilibrium moves along the best response of group B
and towards the region in which it becomes inactive. This illustrates why the range of p
for which monopolization occurs expands when the large group moves first.20 When the
small group is the leader, equilibrium takes place at lower levels of meritocracy. When
allowed to move first, the small group chooses to weaken competition, which induces the
large group to adopt a similar behavior. As a result, both groups enjoy a greater payoff
than in the simultaneous case.
3.2 Endogenous Timing
Although the size of the leader does not matter in terms of the GSP, it does have some
implications regarding the expected utility of groups’ members and aggregate effort. Con-
sider the case where both groups are active for any particular timing. When the large
group is the leader, all its members clearly have higher expected utility than in the si-
multaneous version of the game, while all the members of the small group (the follower)
are worse off. Therefore, a transition from simultaneous to sequential competition where
20An analogous movement along the follower’s best response is responsible for monopolization in Dixit’s



























Figure 4: Simultaneous versus sequential choice of sharing rules with p = 1 (for nA = 4,
nB = 2).
the large group is the leader never consists in a Pareto improvement, and increases aggre-
gate effort. Conversely, when the small group is the leader, the members of both groups
exert less effort than in the simultaneous game, and they achieve higher expected utility.
Thus, switching from simultaneous to sequential competition where the small group is
the leader consists in a Pareto improvement and reduces aggregate effort.
Given these implications, a natural question on which our model can shed light is the
following: If groups were to also choose the timing of the game, which sequence would
prevail? To answer this question, let us assume that prior to the choice of sharing rules,
groups are able to declare their intention to be the leader or the follower of the game.
Suppose the two groups have the possibility of choosing between two dates to declare their
sharing rules. If they choose the same date, sharing rules are chosen simultaneously.
If they choose different dates, sharing rules are chosen sequentially. The results are
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 8.
• If p > p1 the unique equilibrium of the timing game is such that the small group is
the leader.
• If p ≤ p1 the payoff-dominant equilibrium of the timing game is such that the small
group is the leader.
Suppose that the prize is private enough so that both groups are active in the simul-
taneous setup. If the small group selects its sharing rule at date one, the large group
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prefers to wait, whereas if the small group selects its sharing rule at date two, the large
group takes the lead. Hence the large group always prefers the sequential version of the
game. On the contrary, if the large group selects its sharing rule at date one, so does the
small group, whereas if the large group moves at date two, the small group takes the lead.
Therefore, the unique equilibrium of the game with an endogenous choice of the timing
structure gives the leadership to the small group. This is also the case under monopo-
lization, provided that we select the payoff-dominant equilibrium among all the possible
equilibria.21 Further, with an endogenous timing selection previous to the rent-seeking
activity, the GSP should never take place.
Again, the fact that the sequential game arises endogenously constitutes a strong jus-
tification for departing from the simultaneity assumption. This result is in line with the
one in contests among individuals where the sequential timing also arises endogenously
(Baik and Shogren, 1992; Leininger, 1993; Morgan, 2003).22 In the presence of asymmet-
ric players, the higher valuation player —whose best-response function is increasing at
the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game— gives the leadership to the underdog
—whose best-response function is decreasing at the Nash equilibrium of the simultane-
ous game (Baik and Shogren, 1992; Leininger, 1993). We provide an analogous result in
the context of group sharing rules: The large group —whose best-response function is
increasing— gives the leadership to the small group —whose best-response function is
decreasing, resulting in weaker competition between the groups.23 As indicated in the
introduction, the finding by Kolmar and Wagener (2013) that weak groups sometimes
decide not to adopt a mechanism that would solve the group’s free-rider problem with
respect to the members’ effort choices is related to this finding. By refraining from adopt-
ing the mechanism, a weak group deters the stronger group from competing intensely,
thereby weakening competition.
21Given the multiplicity of equilibria when p ≤ p1, any timing can arise endogenously as an equilibrium
depending on the particular sharing rule that groupB selects out of the continuum. A reasonable selection
criterion which allows a comparison across the three versions of the game is payoff dominance. Given
that the small group B is inactive regardless of the particular timing (and thus obtains zero profits),
payoff dominance simply requires that monopolization occurs with the small group selecting the smallest
αB out of the continuum. Further, we also use payoff dominance to select among the multiple Nash
equilibria of the timing game.
22The industrial organization literature has also extensively considered endogenous timing. See for
instance Amir and Grilo (1999), Deneckere and Kovenock (1992), Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and
Van Damme and Hurkens (1999) in the context of a duopoly model.
23Notice that, in the papers on individual contests, the best-response functions refer to an effort choice,
whereas in our model they refer to the choice of a group sharing rule.
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4 Discussion
Collective contests have drawn a lot of attention given their wide range of applications.
In this paper, we contribute to this literature by studying the case in which groups are
allowed to determine their sharing rules sequentially. We believe such an analysis is rele-
vant for several reasons. First, we show that the sequential choice of sharing rules emerges
endogenously when the groups are allowed to decide upon the timing of the game. Sec-
ond, we provide real life examples in which the compensations of organizations’ members
are public information and are chosen in a sequential fashion. Thus, our framework fits
well with compensation schemes in litigation firms or with the debate on the regulation
of executive compensation disclosure. Third, we show that the timing according to which
organizations of different sizes choose their sharing rules has several consequences of in-
terest from the perspective of a contest designer. Despite being highly stylized, our model
provides interesting insights regarding the interaction between groups’ size, the nature of
the prize and the timing of choices.
The relative size of the first mover is key to our results. The large group is more
aggressive when allowed to move first than in the simultaneous contest, while the small
group acting as the leader follows the opposite strategy. This is a direct consequence of
the fact that the small group’s sharing rule is a strategic complement to the large group’s
sharing rule, while the large group’s sharing rule is a strategic substitute to the small
group’s. The public-private nature of the prize also plays an important role. When the
large group moves first and organizations compete for a prize that is close to the definition
of a pure private good, aggregate effort is greater than in the simultaneous case. However,
the opposite is true when the public component of the contested-prize is sufficiently high,
or when the small group moves first and the contested prize is sufficiently private.
We also provide interesting insights regarding the GSP and monopolization, two sit-
uations that can arise when the choice of sharing rules is simultaneous. First, the large
group takes advantage of its leadership by excluding the small group from the competi-
tion for a larger set of parameters than in the simultaneous case. Yet, this is not the case
for the small group, as having a first mover advantage does not allow its members to re-
duce the set of parameters for which monopolization occurs. Regarding the occurrence of
monopolization, the GSP never arises under a sequential timing regardless of the leader’s
size. When allowed to move first, the large group increases the degree of meritocracy of its
sharing rule, thereby increasing the effort of its members and preventing the small group
to outperform. On the contrary, the small group acting as the leader does exactly the
opposite, which reduces its members’ effort thus making it easier for the large group to
outperform. Overall, our work extends knowledge on the occurrence of the GSP in group
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contests and therefore complements previous literature summarized in Kolmar (2013).
In particular, we show that the timing of the sharing rules choice proves an additional
determinant of the GSP along with known results on the technology of conflict through
the impact or cost function (Esteban and Ray, 2001; Pecorino and Temimi, 2008; Kolmar
and Rommeswinkel, 2011, 2013; Hwang, 2017), the nature of the contested prize (Balart




Before proceeding with the proofs of our results and following the arguments by Balart
et al. (2016) we sketch how groups’ best responses are determined. Although these are
not new results their replication is helpful in understanding the rest of our arguments.
Given the equilibrium effort levels if both groups are active as presented in equation
(4), the expected utility for the representative individual in group i = A,B is given by
EˆU i(αA, αB) =
[ninj+((αi−1)(ni−1)nj+αjni(1−nj))p]V
ni[njp+ni(2nj(1−p)+p)]2 [ni(2ni − 1)nj − Cp+D(ni − 1)p
2]
where
C = ni(1− αj − ni) + nj(1− αi) + ni(4ni + αi + αj − 5)nj
D = αi(nj − 1) + αj(nj − 1) + (ni − 1)(2nj − 1)
Given the equilibrium effort levels if only group i is active as presented in equation
(3), the expected utility for the representative individual in group i is given by
E˜U i(αi) = V − (ni − 1)(ni + αi)
n2i
pV
Now let us define χi(αA, αB) = (1−αi)p(ninj − nj)− (1−αj)p(ninj − ni)− ninj(1−
p)− pni with i = A,B and j 6= i. Condition (2) for the occurrence of monopolization is
equivalent to χi(αi, αj) > 0. Notice that χi(αi, αj) +χj(αi, αj) = −nA [2nB(1− p) + p]−
nBp < 0. Hence if χi(αi, αj) > 0 then χj(αi, αj) < 0, meaning that if i is inactive j must
be active.











χj(αi, αj) is strictly increasing in αi, αi2(αj) is the minimum value of αi which guarantees
that members of group j are inactive in the effort stage for a given αj.
Solving χi(αi3(αj), αj) = 0 we define αi3(αj) =
njp+ni[nj+αjp−(αj+1)njp]
(1−ni)njp . Given that
χi(αi, αj) is strictly decreasing in αi then for all α˙i ∈ [0, αi3(αj)] it also holds that
χi(α˙i, αj) > 0 and thus group i is inactive.
Given that αi2(αj) > αi3(αj) we can write the expected utility as follows:
EUi(αi) =

0 if 0 ≤ αi ≤ αi3(αj)
EˆU i(αA, αB) if αi3(αj) < αi < αi2(αj)
E˜U i(αi) if αi ≥ αi2(αj)
Notice that EUi(αi) is a continuous function since from the above expressions
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limαi→αi3(αj) EˆU i(αA, αB) = 0 and limαi→αi2(αj) EˆU i(αA, αB) = E˜U i(αi)
Notice that E˜U i(αi) is strictly decreasing in αi, while EˆU i(αA, αB) is a strictly concave
function (the second derivative is 2nB(nA−1)
2[nB(p−1)−p]p2V
nA[nBp+nA(2nB(1−p)+p)]2 < 0). Thus, in the unrestricted
domain αi ∈ (−∞,+∞), EˆU i(αA, αB) attains a maximum at
αi1(αj) =
nj [ni(1− p) + p] [nj(2− 2ni(1− p)− 3p)− (ni − 2)p]− (nj − 1)(ni − nj)p2αj
2(ni − 1)nj [nj(p− 1)− p] p
(6)
If αi1(αj) ≤ αi3(αj), it follows from the above observations that EUi(αi) is strictly
decreasing in αi for all αi > αi3(αj) and therefore negative. In that case, maxαiEUi(αi) =
0 which is attained at any α˙i ∈ [0, αi3(αj)]. Comparing the expressions for αi1(αj) and
αi3(αj), it holds that αi1(αj) ≤ αi3(αj) if and only if
αj ≥ nj
nj − 1
ni(1− p) + p
p
= αˆj
If αi1(αj) ≥ αi2(αj), it follows from strict concavity of EˆU i(αA, αB) that maxαiEUi(αi) =
maxαiE˜U i(αi). Since, E˜U i(αi) is strictly decreasing in αi, then EUi(αi) has a unique
global maximum at αi2(αj). Comparing, αi1(αj) and αi2(αj), it holds that αi1(αj) ≥
αi2(αj) if and only if
αj ≤ nj[ni(1− p) + 3p− 2]− 2p
(nj − 1)p = α˜j
Finally, EUi(αi) has a unique global maximum at αi1(αj) if αi3(αj) < αi1(αj) <
αi2(αj). Using the above thresholds, the best response of group i can be summarized as
αi(αj) =

αi2(αj) for αj ≤ α˜j
αi1(αj) for α˜j < αj < αˆj
α˙i ∈ [0, αi3(αj)] for αj ≥ αˆj
(7)
If group j selects a very “meritocratic” rule (i.e., αj > αˆj) then it is not worth for
group i to be active, so that it selects α˙i. If on the contrary group j selects a very
“egalitarian” rule (i.e., αj ≤ α˜j), it is then group i that prevents group j from being
active. For intermediate values of αj, group i selects αi1(αj) and thus both groups are
active.
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Proof of Proposition 1. The proof relies on the best responses derived in the Preliminaries
of this appendix. Taking derivatives of αA1(αB) and αB1(αB) as presented in (6) we








2nA(nB−1)[nA(1−p)+p] < 0, hence αA is a strategic substitute for group B.
Proof of Proposition 2. Maximizing the expected utility of the representative individual
of group i in the within-group symmetric equilibrium also maximizes the aggregate welfare
of group i. Therefore, in this proof and the subsequent ones, we focus on the sharing rule
αi that maximizes the expected utility of the representative individual in group i, which
we denote by EU i(αA, αB).
The best response of group B as presented in (7) is:
αB(αA) =

αB2(αA) for αA ≤ α˜A
αB1(αA) for α˜A < αA < αˆA
α˙B ∈ [0, αB3(αA)] for αA ≥ αˆA
The expected utility of group A being the leader is given by:
EUA(αA) =

0 if αA ≤ α˜A
EˆUA(αA, αB1(αA)) if α˜A < αA < αˆA
E˜UA(αA) if αA ≥ αˆA
Notice that EUA(αA) is a continuous function since
limαA→α˜A EˆUA(αA, αB1(αA)) = 0 and limαA→αˆA EˆUA(αA, αB1(αA)) = E˜UA(αˆA)




EˆUA(αA, αB1(αA)) is a strictly concave function in the unrestricted domain αA ∈ (−∞,+∞),
and obtains a global maximum at αLA = 1 + nA
1−p
p
, where αLA is the solution of the first-
order condition ∂EˆUA(αA,αB1(αA))
∂αA
= 0. Given that E˜UA(αA) is strictly decreasing with
respect to αA, αˆA strictly dominates any αA > αˆA. As α
L
A > α˜A, it follows that EUA(αA)
is maximized at min{αLA, αˆA} and thus the corresponding expected utility is strictly pos-





• If p ≤ p′1, group A selects αˆA = nA(nA−1)
nB(1−p)+p
p
leading to the inactivity of group
B, and group B selects any αB ∈ [0, nB(1−p)+pp ], with the upper bound being the
solution of αB = αB3(αˆA) guaranteeing the inactivity of group B.
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• If p > p′1 there exists a unique equilibrium such that both groups are active. Group
A selects αLA = 1 + nA
1−p
p













+ (1 − p) we can rewrite the equilibrium sharing rules as presented in
the main text.
Proof of Proposition 3.
• If p ≤ p1 monopolization arises both in the simultaneous and in the sequential cases
and there is a continuum of equilibria. By comparing the equilibrium supports of αSB
and αFB we can see that the lower bound of the former is equal to the upper bound
of the latter which guarantees that αFB ≤ αSB. Similarly, αLA is equal to the lowest
possible value in the support of αSA, which guarantees that α
L
A ≤ αSA. Given that




is strictly increasing in αA, hence aggregate effort is greater in the simultaneous case.
• If p1 < p ≤ p′1 monopolization only arises in the sequential case. Equilibrium






while equilibrium aggregate effort in the sequential case where group B is inactive is
given by ELA = (nB+p−nBp)V . Therefore, equilibrium aggregate effort is greater in
the simultaneous case if and only if [nA(p−1)−p][(nA−nB−1)nB(1−p)−p]V
nA[2nB(1−p)+p]+nBp ≤ 0. Notice that
the denominator is always positive and the first term of the nominator is always
negative. The second term of the numerator is positive if and only if p ≤ p1 which
is not in the analyzed interval. Hence, equilibrium aggregate effort is greater in the
sequential case.
• If p > p′1 both groups are active in both the simultaneous and sequential cases.
Thus we now have that equilibrium aggregate effort in the sequential case where






Therefore, equilibrium aggregate effort is greater in the sequential case if and only
if (nA−nB)[nA(1+nA−nB)(1−p)+p]pV
2nA[nA(2nB(1−p)+p)+nBp] > 0 which is always true for any p > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Clearly, if the small group is inactive, the GSP cannot occur. If
p > p′1, the GSP arises if and only if
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αLA <
nA − nB + 2αFBnA(nB − 1)
2nB(nA − 1)
Substituting for the equilibrium value of αLA and α
F
B from Proposition 1, the above
condition reduces to
nA(nA − nB)(p− 1) [nA(2nB(p− 1)− p)− nBp]
2(nA − 1)nBp [nA(1− p) + p] < 0
As the denominator is positive, the condition holds if and only if the numerator is
negative, which requires p > 1. Hence we reach a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5. The best response of group B as presented in (7) is:
αA(αB) =

αA2(αB) for αB ≤ α˜B
αA1(αB) for α˜B < αB < αˆB
α˙A ∈ [0, αA3(αB)] for αB ≥ αˆB
The expected utility of group B being the leader is given by:
EUB(αB) =

0 if αB ≤ α˜B
EˆUB(αA1(αB), αB) if α˜B < αB < αˆB
E˜UB(αB) if αB ≥ αˆB
Notice that EUB(αB) is a continuous function since
limαB→α˜B EˆUB(αA1(αB), αB) = 0 and limαB→αˆB EˆUB(αA1(αB), αB) = E˜UB(αˆB)




Thus, EˆUB(αA1(αB), αB) is a strictly concave function in the unrestricted domain αB ∈
(−∞,+∞), and obtains a global maximum at αLB = 1+nB 1−pp , where αLB is the solution of
the first-order condition ∂EˆUB(αA1(αB),αB)
∂αB
= 0. Given that E˜UB(αB) is strictly decreasing
with respect to αB, αˆB strictly dominates any αB > αˆB. Observe that α
L
B < αˆB always
holds, while αLB ≤ α˜B if and only if p ≤ p1. Therefore,





so that it remains










• If p > p1 there exists a unique equilibrium such that both groups are active. Group
B selects αLB = 1 + nB
(1−p)
p














+ (1 − p) we can rewrite the equilibrium sharing rules as presented in
the main text.
Proof of Proposition 6.
• If p ≤ p1 monopolization arises both in the simultaneous and in the sequential cases
and there is a continuum of equilibria. By comparing the equilibrium supports of




(nB−1)p ] we can see
that their upper bounds coincide. Therefore, αLB < α
S






under monopolization group A’s equilibrium sharing rule is strictly increasing in








A. Given that only group A is active,
equilibrium aggregate effort is equal to nA
αAp(nA−1)
n2A
V which is strictly increasing in





When the supports of the two equilibria overlap (i.e., for αLB ≥ nB(1−p)+pp ), αLB can
be either greater or smaller than αSB. Following the same reasoning as before, we
have that aggregate effort in the sequential case can be either greater or smaller
than in the simultaneous case depending on the specific value of αB one considers
in each game.
• If p > p1 both groups are active in both the simultaneous and sequential cases.






while equilibrium aggregate effort in the sequential case where the small group






equilibrium aggregate effort is strictly greater in the simultaneous case if and only
if (nA−nB)p[(nA−nB−1)nB(p−1)+p]V
2nB [nA(2nB(1−p)+p)+nBp] > 0. Given that the denominator is positive, this
requires that the numerator is also positive, hence that [(nA−nB−1)nB(p−1)+p] >
0, which is true if and only if p > p1. Consequently, aggregate effort in the sequential
case is strictly smaller than in the simultaneous case for any p > p1.
Proof of Proposition 7. Clearly, if the small group is inactive, the GSP cannot occur. If
p > p1, the GSP arises if and only if
αFA <
nA − nB + 2αLBnA(nB − 1)
2nB(nA − 1)
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Substituting for the equilibrium value of αFA and α
L
B from Proposition 3, the above
condition reduces to
(nA − nB)(p− 1) [nA(2nB(p− 1)− p)− nBp]
2(nA − 1)p [nB(1− p) + p] < 0
As the denominator is positive, the condition holds if and only if the numerator is
negative, which requires p > 1. Hence we reach a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 8.
• p ≤ p1
We are in the case where monopolization occurs regardless of the particular timing of
the game. As we are looking for the payoff-dominant equilibrium of the timing game,
we shall assume that group B selects the minimum sharing rule out of the continuum of































Let (i, j) denote a Nash equilibria of the timing game, where i (j) is the action of
group A (B), that is, i, j = L, F . Given the above, there will be three Nash equilibria of
the timing game: (L, F ),(F,L) and (F, F ). Out of these three equilibria, the one where
group A achieves the highest payoff is (F,L) (i.e., B is the leader). As we assumed that
group B selects the smallest αB out of the equilibrium support for any possible timing, the
equilibrium (F,L) is clearly the payoff-dominant one (i.e., the one such that A achieves
the highest payoff).
• p1 < p ≤ p′1
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We are in the case where monopolization occurs when the large group A is the leader.




2ninj(ni − 1) + Cip+Dip2
p [2ninj − p(ni(2nj − 1)− nj)]
where Ci = ninj(9− 4ni)−nj(nj + 2)− 2ni and Di = ninj(2ni− 7) +nj(nj + 3) + 3ni− 2. If the large
group A is the leader, we know that αLA =
nA[nB(1−p)+p]
(nA−1)p for any value of α
F
B. Finally, if
the small group B is the leader, we have
αFA =
nB [nA(1− p) + p] [nB(2− 2nA(1− p)− 3p)− (nA − 2)p]− (nB − 1)(nA − nB)p [nB(1− p) + p]
2(nA − 1)nB [nB(p− 1)− p] p
αLB =
nB(1− p) + p
p
Given that αLi 6= αSi for i = A,B, it follows directly that EULi > EUSi for i = A,B.
We then have that
EUSA − EUFA =
{






4nAnB [nB(p− 1)− p]
Isolating p in the previous expression, EUSA − EUFA ≥ 0 can be written as p ≤ p1, hence
EUSA < EU
F
A for any p > p1.
EUSB − EUFB =
nA [nA(1− p) + p] [(nA − nB − 1)nB(p− 1) + p]2 V
nB [nBp+ nA(2nB(1− p) + p)]2
> 0
Given the above, the unique Nash equilibrium of the timing game is (F,L), that is,
B is the leader.
• p > p′1
We are in the case where both groups are active regardless of the particular timing of the
game. With respect to the previous case where p ∈ (p1, p′1], the only difference is that if
the large group A is the leader, we now have
αLA =
nA(1− p) + p
p
αFB =
nA[nB(1− p) + p][nA(2nB(1− p)− 2 + 3p) + (nB − 2)p]− (nA − 1)(nA − nB)p[nA(1− p) + p]
2nA(nB − 1)[nA(1− p) + p]p
Given that αLi 6= αSi for i = A,B, it follows directly that EULi > EUSi for i = A,B.
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We then have that
EUSA − EUFA = −
{






4nAnB [nB(1− p) + p]
Isolating p in the previous expression, EUSA −EUFA ≥ 0 can be written as p ≤ p1. Given
that p1 < p
′




A for any p > p
′
1. Finally, we have that
EUSB − EUFB = −
{






4nAnB [nA(1− p) + p]
















B for any p > p
′
1.
Given the above, the unique Nash equilibrium of the timing game is (F,L), that is,
B is the leader.
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